Introduction
In March 2000 the European Commission presented a Green Paper on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading within the European Union (EU) (COM, 2000a) . The purpose of that document is to find out which design of a European carbon trading market is desirable and/or acceptable by stimulating a discussion among stakeholders, scientists and politicians. The Commission called GHG emissions trading an 'important element' as well as an 'integral and major part' of the Community's implementation strategy (COM, 2000a: 4, 7) to reach its emission reduction target of 8% below 1990 levels for the commitment period 2008 to 2012 agreed upon under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.
In 1998, the EU decided to redistribute its target (or: assigned amount) among its Member States, such as 21% reduction for Germany, stabilization for France and 27% allowable emission growth for Portugal. Although this internal burden sharing arrangement will lower compliance costs, it is not fully efficient because it does not equalize marginal costs among the Member States (Eyckmans and Cornillie, 2000) . In principle, marginal costs can be equalized to obtain efficiency if the EU allows for emissions trading among the governments of its Member States.
However, the disadvantage of intergovernmental emissions trading is that governments have incomplete information on the marginal abatement costs of domestic emitters. The higher this information deficit is, the higher the probability will be that the enacted emissions trading deals are not as cost-effective as would have been possible. Therefore, several economists argue that each government should redistribute its target among domestic emitters by allocating permits to private entities (e.g. Tietenberg, 1999; Zhang and Nentjes, 1999) . In its Green Paper, the European Commission refers to permit trading among private entities as a 'unique opportunity' (COM, 2000a: 9) and it wants to establish an experimental EU-wide permit trading scheme by 2005.
If Member States connect their domestic permit trading schemes, firms can trade across national borders within the EU. This could reduce EU compliance costs by more than 30% (Capros et al., 2000) . If the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol also allow private emissions trading under Article 17, European firms may also trade permits with firms in industrialized countries outside the EU, such as Norway or the United States. Because a larger market widens the scope for efficiency gains, the EU could then reach cost-savings of almost 50% (Capros et al., 2000) .
To reap the economic benefits of permit trading within (and outside) the EU, several political barriers must be taken. One of these barriers is the issue of permit allocation which has both political, economic and legal aspects. In general, there are two ways to allocate permits: private entities have to buy the permits (auctioning) or they get them for free (grandfathering). It is possible that one Member State conducts an auction (for instance to generate revenues), while another uses grandfathering (for instance to generate support from the energy-intensive industry). The Commission fears that such a difference in the way Member States allocate permits to their private entities may distort competition and could lead to state aid (e.g. COM, 2000a: 5) .
Consequently, the objective of this paper is to find out under which conditions European differences in domestic permit allocation procedures (a) lead to competitive distortions according to economic theory and (b) lead to state aid according to European Community (EC) law. The following (and second) section contains the economic analysis which largely builds upon an article by Woerdman (2000a) . 1 The third section contains the legal analysis which explicitly considers the recently revised Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection (OJ, 2001) . The fourth section approaches the issues of competitive distortions and state aid from a political science perspective deemed necessary (but not performed) by Van der Laan and Nentjes (2001) to supplement a law and economics analysis of competitive distortions. The fifth section discusses some limitations of our analysis and sketches an agenda for possible future research. Finally, in the sixth section a conclusion is presented according to which differences among EU Member States in domestic permit allocation procedures can lead to competitive distortions and state aid depending on the perspective taken.
Economic Analysis of Permit Allocation and Competitive Distortions
Van der Laan and Nentjes (2001) note that there are two interpretations of the competitive distortion concept: as an inefficiency in allocation of resources and as an inequity of firms' starting conditions. The issue of permit allocation will be analyzed in relation to competitive in the production of a certain output. Different prices for the same input involve differences in marginal productivity and therefore entails an inefficient allocation of emissions among firms or sectors. Tax exemptions are not capital gifts and do not have opportunity costs, but rather imply that emissions are an input without a price. However, grandfathered permits have opportunity costs and therefore entail a price. Contrary to tax exemptions, efficiency is not distorted by using grandfathering.
The arguments presented above assume perfectly competitive markets. Imperfect competition is unlikely, because the direct participation of private entities in a European (and finally international) GHG emissions trading system is expected to create a thick market with many small traders. There are only a few exceptional cases of imperfect competition where a competitive distortion could arise. An example is a situation where a grandfathered firm starts a price war with an auctioned competitor abroad according to the so-called deep purse theory or theory of predatory pricing (Nentjes et al., 1995) . The grandfathered firm can outlast the auctioned firm (or entrant) in a price war because of its larger capital reserve. However, predatory pricing is unlikely to occur in practice, not only because it is a risky and expensive strategy, but also because energy-intensive firms usually do not compete on monopolistic markets and the additional capital requirements to buy emission permits are a small part (no more than a few percentages) of the total capital requirements. Furthermore, a dominant firm which starts a price war to push aside its competitor abroad could be prosecuted by the EU authorities that enforce antitrust policy.
Competitive Distortions, Equity and Level Playing Field
Although the opportunity costs are the same under grandfathering and auctioning, European permit allocation differences will affect the financial position of firms. This aspect becomes relevant if the concept of competitive distortion is interpreted in terms of equity. A grandfathered firm does not have to buy its permits contrary to an auctioned competitor. A grandfathered firm only has to pay for its emission reductions and not for its emissions, so that it has a lower cash outflow than an identical firm which has to buy its permits. In other words, a grandfathered firm initially buys the permits from itself (opportunity costs), while an auctioned firm buys the permits from the government or the public (cash outflow). If a grandfathered firm receives its permits for free, it obtains a non-distortionary windfall profit (cf. Bohm, 1999; Romstad, 1998) .
Since grandfathering implies a capital gift to the firm, a grandfathered firm has more financial resources, or own capital, than an auctioned firm, which (ceteris paribus) gives the former a stronger financial position than the latter. This can be seen as an inequitable or unfair distortion of competition. Not only the question of how they receive their permits, but also of how much permits they get then becomes relevant, because a firm which receives a generous emission budget is financially better off than an identical firm with a tight emission budget.
There is no single interpretation of the concept of equity or fairness, neither in philosophical theory nor in political practice. Nevertheless, it appears that an unfair competitive distortion in the context of permit allocation usually refers to a distortion of the 'level playing field' for firms, where the associated inequity is primarily defined or perceived in terms of an inequality or asymmetry (e.g. Yamin and Lefevere, 2000) . Woerdman (2000a) argues that the problem of international differences in permit allocation procedures is the inequality of the changes in firms' starting conditions resulting from the mere process of permit allocation. Furthermore, the inequity view does not so much think of competition being distorted because firms face different laws (as contended by Van der Laan and Nentjes, 2001 ), but rather because these different laws have different financial consequences for firms and their competitive relations. The level playing field then refers to the competitive relations between firms. This implies that an unfair competitive distortion would arise if the allocation of permits leads to unequal changes of firms' relative financial positions.
The level playing field approach does not object to the fact that the competitive positions of firms can be unequal because they have different market shares and that their relations may change, both before and after permit allocation, because of their economic activities and strategies. Rather, the level playing field or financial position approach contends that the competitive positions of firms are not allowed to change because of the political process of permit allocation itself (Woerdman, 2000a) . Consequently, the level playing field is maintained if permit allocation leaves the financial positions of firms and their competitive relations unaltered.
Again, there are only a few exceptional cases in which imperfect competition could play a role. In an imperfect capital market, the findings of Koutstaal (1997) imply that a grandfathered firm has a competitive advantage if the auctioned competitor abroad needs to borrow money to buy the permits. The interest to borrow money could exceed the interest on own capital due to the imperfect capital market. The permit expenditures of the auctioned firm are then higher than the opportunity costs of the grandfathered firm due to the interest it has to pay for its loans. However, the practical relevance of this argument is negligible, not only because the interest difference under consideration is small compared with total production costs, but also because the loans will be short-term in a liquid permit market and (contrary to the interest on own capital) the interest charges for loans are tax-deductible.
Legal Analysis of Permit Allocation and State Aid
The In the discussion on permit allocation there are at least five similarities between EC law and WTO rules. Firstly, the debate whether permits are goods or services also plays a minor role in the context of EC law. Just as in the case of the WTO it seems to be the general opinion that permits are neither goods nor services (cf. Lefevere and Yamin, 1999; Werksman, 1999 Firstly, with respect to the first criterion of state origin, the aid must be granted by the State or through state resources. It could be claimed that grandfathering (although it is a transfer of permits) is not a genuine or direct transfer of resources, since the permits are allocated for free by the State. Nevertheless, the opposite can well be defended by stressing that these permits have market value and that the capital gift induced by grandfathering is an (in)direct transfer of state resources. Furthermore, indicate, on the basis of COM (1998) , that the state origin criterion requires a transfer of resources from the State (or in the State) receiving, actually or potentially, less revenues in order for state aid to exist. It could be argued that the State will receive less revenues in the case of grandfathering compared to either (pre-existing) taxation or auctioning, because grandfathering can be interpreted as giving the (hypothetical) auction revenue to the polluters (Welch, 1983: 168) .
Secondly, with respect to the other three criteria, grandfathering should be seen as an advantage which affects trade by favouring specific firms and thus distorts competition according to the level playing field approach, but not according to the reasoning of the opportunity cost approach. Interestingly, the Commission not only mentions the desirability of a level playing field, where firms are treated on an equal footing, in the context of state aid (e.g. COM, 1998: 79; OJ, 2001: 13) , but it also describes the firm advantage criterion as a financial advantage which improves a firm's market position (e.g. COM, 1999b: 84) . This view also seems to be reinforced by the interpretation of specificity by Jans (1995: 262) 
Permit Allocation and State Aid Exemptions
However, not all state aid is prohibited under European competition law. Article 87 (3) Shortly, state aid can be allowed if:
(1) the aid promotes the execution of an important project of common European interest;
(2) the aid remedies a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
(3) the aid facilitates the development of certain economic activities or areas;
(4) the European Council decides that the aid is compatible with the common market.
Firstly, even if grandfathering should be seen as state aid, it can nevertheless be allowed on the basis of Article 87 (3) does not promote climate change mitigation if the perception dominates that it distorts competition or that polluters should not obtain the right to pollute for free and therefore must pay for it by purchasing the permits from society or the government (Grafton and Devlin, 1996) . In addition, the Community guidelines require that the aid, in this case considering grandfathering, must be necessary for the adoption or continuation of the project (OJ, 2001: 6, 13) , which may be difficult to defend unless the political acceptance of emissions trading exclusively hinges on grandfathering.
Secondly, Article 87(3)(b) also allows state aid if the aid is used to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. It is clear that auctioning (as well as taxation) entails a financial burden for polluters, but it is not evident that auctioning would thus create a 'disturbance' in the economy of a Member State which is 'serious' enough to allow for grandfathering as the remedy against it. Although several environmental economists argue that grandfathering facilitates the political acceptance of tradeable permits, they also recognize that internalizing the costs of pollution by means of emissions trading is not a disturbance, but rather a correction of the economy (cf. Bohm, 1999; Grubb et al., 1998) .
Nevertheless, some environmental economists argue that auctioning is more efficient than grandfathering, because the auction revenues can be recycled to lower distortionary taxes (e.g. Goulder et al., 1999) . If grandfathering should be seen as aid, it may then still be allowed provided that it is seen as a temporary second-best solution (OJ, 2001: 5) . In addition, because of its financial effects, grandfathering prevents that the competitiveness of firms -deemed important by the Commission (OJ, 2001: 5) -is reduced, as long as competitors abroad are not subject to an emission cap, but this argument becomes invalid if other Member States also establish trading schemes and allocate permits to similar sectors.
Thirdly, grandfathering may be exempted from the state aid prohibition on the basis of Article 87(3)(c), which provides that aid may be considered compatible with the common market if it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. On the one hand, if the opportunity costs of using grandfathered permits imply that they do not affect efficiency and hence trading conditions, it could also be argued that they have the same effect as auctioned permits on the development of certain economic activities or areas precisely because they have no cost advantage. On the other hand, it could be defended that grandfathered permits do facilitate the development of certain economic activities or areas, because they are a capital gift giving the firm a stronger financial position than under auctioning. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 'conditions' of trading do not so much refer to the trading itself, but rather to the level playing field, the prerequisites for fair competition or the pre-allocative competitive relations between firms. This could suggest that permit allocation differences between Member States or grandfathering itself should be seen as harming the common interest by affecting the level playing field according to the inequity view of a competitive distortion. However, in practice, Article 87(3)(c) has already been used several times to allow for state aid, for instance in the case of the energy-intensive industries in the Netherlands and Denmark as well as Norway, Sweden and Finland, which were exempted from a tax on CO 2 emissions (Baron, 1997; Heller, 1998; Jans, 1995) .
Interestingly, these exemptions were introduced to accommodate competitiveness concerns of energy-intensive industries which argued that they would financially suffer from similar industries operating in countries without such taxation (OJ, 1994: 8; COM, 2000c: 27) .
Although some would make a comparison by claiming that grandfathering will be exempted from state aid because it resembles a tax exemption, it should be noted that tax exemptions distort efficiency because it induces different prices per unit of GHG for different firms, whereas grandfathered permits do not distort efficiency because they have opportunity costs and therefore entail a price (as explained in a previous section). Consequently, the opportunity cost argument would imply that if grandfathering is to be regarded as state aid, it will be exempted from the state aid prohibition rules even more easily than the aforementioned tax.
Nevertheless, in the political arena grandfathering could perhaps be perceived as being even 'worse' than a tax exemption, because the former necessitates a new framework which formally gives an emitter the right to produce a limited amount of pollution, which is more visible and definitive than exempting an emitter (temporarily) from an arrangement in an existing scheme. Moreover, grandfathering may be considered problematic on the basis of It requires that the costs of measures to deal with pollution should be borne by the polluter who causes the pollution (OJ, 2001: 3) . According to Jans (1995) , the principle demands that external costs are reflected in the product price, which means that a competitive distortion would occur when externalities are not (fully) reflected in these prices. This seems to suggest that permit allocation is not problematic, because external costs are reflected in the product price not only under auctioning due to the costs of buying the permits, but also under grandfathering due to the opportunity costs of using the permits. However, the European Commission (COM, 2000a) explicitly stated that auctioning applies the polluter pays principle, simply because polluters literally pay for their pollution by means of purchasing the permits from the government. It is thus not clear whether grandfathering will be seen as compatible with the polluter pays principle. On the one hand, although grandfathered polluters do not pay for their emissions, they do pay for their emission reductions (assuming it did not receive 'hot air' permits). On the other hand, grandfathering is a wealth transfer from the public to the polluters, which implies that the public pays by giving the polluters the auctioning revenues (cf. Grafton and Devlin, 1996; Welch, 1983) . If grandfathering should thus be seen as state aid or as an indemnity which is incompatible with the polluter pays principle, it may even follow from the statements of the Commission that grandfathering is not allowed at all.
5
The Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection could suggest that firms can only receive a part of their permits for free and that grandfathering is only allowed temporarily (OJ, 2001) . When considering investment aid and operating aid (including tax exemptions) below, it is assumed that emission permits are a form of operating licences. This assumption seems reasonable, because without such permits a firm is not allowed to operate. Emission permits (grandfathered or auctioned) are legally required in an emissions trading scheme if firms want to produce a certain (limited) amount of pollution.
Firstly, in the context of investment aid, small or medium-sized enterprises (SME's) may receive aid no longer than three years and against no more than 15% gross of the eligible costs. 6 However, if firms improve on the Community standards, this percentage may be raised to 30% (or 40% for SME's). This percentage may be as high as 40% (or 50% for SME's) for investments in energy saving and 50% (or 60% for SME's) for investments in renewable energy to supply an entire community (such as a residential area). These percentages may be increased by 5 to 10% for regions which are eligible for national regional aid. The acquisition of operating licences may also qualify, provided that they are depreciable assets purchased on market terms which are used for at least five years. Emission permits should probably not be seen as depreciable assets, but as assets with market value (which will decrease or increase depending on supply and demand). If (grandfathered) permits would be depreciable assets, they could not be sold on the market during the first five years of their use, which would be inconsistent with their tradeable nature.
Secondly, in the context of operating aid, which is probably more relevant (provided that grandfathering should be seen as aid) because an emissions trading system legally requires firms to have emission permits to be allowed to operate, firms may receive the aid no longer than five years. If the level of aid decreases each year ('degressive aid'), which should be the general rule, the intensity may amount to 100% of the extra costs in the first year but must have fallen in a linear fashion to zero by the end of the fifth year. If the level of aid is the same during these years ('non-degressive aid'), a firm may receive no more than 50% of the extra costs necessary to meet the environmental objectives. Tax exemptions are also seen as operating aids and may only be granted, among other things (see above), for a limited period of time with a maximum of ten years (or five years in the case of energy-efficiency improvements). A temporary relief from environmental taxes may be authorized by the Commission with a view to the risks of a loss of international competitiveness. This could 6 Eligible costs are defined as the extra investment costs necessary to meet the environmental objectives (OJ, 2001: 8). imply that grandfathering, which could be introduced to accommodate similar competitiveness concerns, may also be deemed compatible with European law as long as it is a temporary transition (of possibly five or ten years) to an auctioned scheme.
The investment and operating provisions above could imply that firms may receive no more than a certain percentage (for instance 50%) of their permits for free during a limited period after which they have to buy their permits via an auction. Alternatively, if governments would agree upon a five year transition period, the implication could be that the annually (re)allocated permits are allowed to be grandfathered for 100% in the first year, 80% in the second year, 60% in the third year, 40% in the fourth year and 20% in the fifth year, so that all permits are auctioned (and thus 0% is grandfathered) in the sixth year when the transition period is over. However, the Community guidelines only allow firms to receive aid over their extra investment costs necessary to reduce emissions, so that it could be argued that they may not receive aid over their entire emissions. In efficiency terms, firms may thus not only be grandfathered, but they may also receive some aid (under the conditions specified above) for the costs they spend to reduce their emissions. In equity terms, grandfathering is seen as aid (as demonstrated in a previous section), but auctioned firms still seem to be allowed under the EC rules to receive some aid for their expenses on emission reductions. Furthermore, the observations above also suggest that the rejection or approval of (possibly temporary and/or partial) grandfathering not only rests, among other things, on the debate of whether gratis permits are state aid, but also on what type of aid it encompasses.
Political Analysis of Permit Allocation and Perceptions
From a law and economics perspective, it is ambiguous whether grandfathering, in the case of dissimilarities in permit allocation between EC Member States, satisfies each of the aforementioned four criteria for state aid to exist, and if it does, whether or not it will be exempted from the state aid injunction. It appears that, similar to the WTO issue on actionable subsidies (Woerdman, 2000a) , the EC issue of state aid mainly depends on whether one is willing to accept the opportunity cost argument or the level playing field argument.
On the one hand, it could be maintained that grandfathering may be difficult to implement in Europe, because the EC rules and decisions on competition and state aid as discussed above refer more frequently and explicitly to financial effects and equity consequences (e.g. EC Article 81; COM, 2000a: 7, 12, 14, 15, 19; COM, 2000b: 75; COM, 1999b: 84; COM, 1998: 79) 
Perceptions in Political Decisions on Permit Allocation
From a political science perspective, it does not so much matter in the political process whether international differences in domestic permit allocation can 'objectively' lead to competitive distortions according to some economic theory or equity principle. Rather, the agents involved act 'subjectively' on the basis of their perceptions of such issues. For instance, in the context of competitiveness, Golub ascertains: 'Regardless of whether the available evidence proves or disproves a conclusive relationship between economic performance and environmental regulation, the important point (...) is that the possible or perceived loss of competitiveness constitutes as much a political as an empirical matter, and figures prominently in industry's resistance (...) ' (Golub, 1998: 8) . Likewise, Rowlands (1998) suggests that the EU policy for ozone layer protection has been shaped to a large 7 Yamin and Lefevere (2000: 30) argue: 'The aim of competition provisions of EC law is to secure a level playing field for competitors wherever they are located in the EC. This notion goes beyond the narrow conception of competitiveness which economists focus on'. Likewise, Van der Laan and Nentjes (2001: 148) find: 'The Treaty is not as one-dimensional as economists may believe or wish'. In a similar fashion, Cini and McGowan (1998: 158) conclude that, in practice, multiple policy objectives are 'fundamental in tempering the neo-liberal rhetoric of the state aid directorate'.
extent by a perceived negative relationship between economic competitiveness and environmental regulations.
The fact is that various actors have the perception that international permit allocation dissimilarities may lead to competitive distortions, which can be seen as a barrier to the international political acceptance of permit trading (Woerdman, 2000b) . The discretionary power of the European Council to decide -on the basis of a proposal by the Commission -that grandfathering is exempted from the state aid provisions means that a political decision will be pivotal to the issue of grandfathering, state aid and permit allocation differences between EC Member States. Financial and equity arguments are likely to play a role in such a decision, not only with a view to the historical relevance of the level playing field argument in European environmental legislation (Hargrave et al., 1999: 11) and state aid policy (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 158) , but also considering the continuously recurring reference made by the Commission in its recent Green Paper on GHG emissions trading in the EC to 'fair competition' (pages 7 and 12), 'conditions for equal competition'
(page 14) and a 'level playing field' (page 15) as well as to the relation between competitive distortions and financial (dis)advantages (page 19) for firms (COM, 2000a) . This could imply that an EC Member State will not be left free to grandfather permits in the amount and to whom it likes, but rather that permit allocation rules will be harmonized across the EC to avoid unfair competitive distortions. However, the Green Paper does mention the concept of opportunity costs once (page 20) when discussing the issue of new entrants to the European carbon trading market (COM, 2000a) .
Those who plead against harmonizing permit allocation procedures primarily use the opportunity cost argument (e.g. Hargrave et al., 1999; Zhang, 1999) , whereas those who plead in favour of harmonization mainly use the level playing field argument (e.g. Jepma et al., 1998; Lefevere and Yamin, 1999) . This does not mean that the latter authors want to centralize all permit allocation decisions, but rather that they prefer Member States to negotiate and formulate basic rules for domestic permit allocation, for instance whether or not
(and on what basis) to grandfather to certain sectors (e.g. the electricity sector). Other authors steer a middle course by advancing weak or limited forms of harmonization. For instance,
Kerr (1999) is against regulating the way in which EC Member States allocate permits by using the opportunity cost argument, but she uses the level playing field argument (similar to Yamin and Lefevere, 2000) to plead in favour of coordinating how much permits governments allocate to each sector. Another variant, also in the context of the EC, is provided by Lefevere and Yamin (1999) who mention the possibility of a 'shared competence scheme' in which efficiency and trade barrier issues are regulated at the central level (Community) while all other issues are left to individual governments (Member States).
However, these alternative options still have to be worked out in detail.
Still, some claim that harmonization is undesirable or even impossible in the first place by argueing, among other things, that states are sovereign (e.g. Zhang, 1998b; Petsonk, 1999) .
Although the level of harmonization is indeed likely to be dependent on the extent in which Member States are willing to maintain their national sovereignty as it currently exists, we dismiss the idea that state sovereignty is violated in the case of harmonization. Rather, state sovereignty is maintained, arguably at a lower level, if these governments voluntarily accept international rules on domestic permit allocation. For instance, such rules could be made part of the eligibility criteria Member States must meet to join the European (or international) permit trading system. Cini and McGowan (1998) have also drawn the conclusion that politics plays a role in the state aid decisions of the Commission, both in terms of political values and perceived national interests. The impact of values (cf. Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995) suggests that not only efficiency, but also equity is likely to be considered in a decision on permit allocation, which -in itself -increases the chance that grandfathering will be seen as state aid. However, a Member State's perception of its national interests in relation to permit allocation and state aid will lie somewhere between two extremes, that is (a) the desire to protect the national sovereignty of being free to allocate the permits as domestically preferred and (b) the desire to protect the national economy and industry against Member States who are free to choose any permit allocation they like which could result in a competitive advantage for the competitors abroad.
8 Which (mixture of) desire(s) will finally be dominant in the Commission is uncertain.
A political indication is provided by the report of the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP, 2001 ). This programme, in which many stakeholders were invited to participate, is initiated and intended by the Commission to prepare a proposal on climate change policy to be made to the Council and the European Parliament in the course of 2001. Without providing any reasons for their findings, the report not only warns against competitive distortions due to permit allocation and underlines the desirability of a level playing field, but also states that permit allocation differences do not necessarily give rise to distortions within the internal market and claims that distortions are likely to be temporary (ECCP, 2001: 8-10 ). The report concludes that 'Member States should be allowed to choose their own initial method of allocation, subject to obtaining any appropriate State Aid approvals' (ECCP, 2001: 9) . From this it is not clear whether the equity interpretation or the efficiency interpretation prevails, not only because the report does not mention any reasons for these views, but also because it prefers a case-by-case assessment of potential state aid issues arising from permit allocation.
However, the rejection of harmonizing allocation procedures, and thus the apparent preference for sovereignty, seems to run counter to the equity interpretation. Still, again without providing a foundation for the argument, the report expects a progressive evolution towards auctioning in the longer term (ECCP, 2001: 8) . A legal indication of which desires and perceptions will finally be dominant in the Commission is provided by the Commission's decision on state aid in the Danish domestic carbon trading scheme, which will be treated in the following subsection.
The Political Precedent of Domestic Carbon Trading in Denmark
An important albeit limited 'test case' for the competitive distortion and state aid issues in an EU-wide carbon trading market is the political precedent of domestic carbon trading for the power sector in Denmark. The Danish case is important, not only because it is the first domestic and obligatory scheme in Europe which will already be operational before 2001
(when the emission ceiling for electricity producers will come into effect), but also because the European Commission reached a decision on the Danish allocation of permits in the context of state aid (COM, 2000d). 9 This decision is bound to set a political precedent for future thinking about -and decisions on -(differences in) permit allocation in a European carbon trading market. However, the relevance of the Danish case is also limited, not only because its trading scheme will already end in 2003, but also because the European Commission clearly indicated that its decision in the particular case of Denmark does not necessarily set a legal precedent for future decisions on emissions trading schemes.
According to Act 376 of 2 June 1999 (originally Bill 235) of the Danish parliament, tradeable permits are grandfathered to electricity producers in Denmark -irrespective of whether they are Danish or foreign owned -based on their historical CO 2 emissions during the period 1994 (Folketinget, 1999 COM, 2000d) . The scheme runs from 2001 to 2003, but if any new entrants would arrive during this period (which is not expected), they will be allocated quotas 'on the same terms' as incumbents following objective and nondiscriminatory criteria. The aforementioned Act will then be amended which will be notified again to the Commission. According to Haites et al. (2000) , the reallocation of permits in the The Commission approved the state aid in Denmark, among other things, because of its desire to gain experience with and prepare for emissions trading (reason (1) and (3)). This provides some support for our conjecture that a Commission's state aid decision is at least partly based on political considerations and trade-offs. It also shows that there is broad room for interpreting the exemption rules which goes beyond a strict law and economics approach.
Several reasons for the exemption of grandfathering have nothing to do with the allocation per se (grandfathering versus auctioning), but rather relate to the (other and more general) characteristics of the scheme itself.
The presence of political arguments and the absence of the opportunity cost argument in the economic analysis of grandfathering by the Commission can be interpreted in two ways. A pessimist might see them as another example of sometimes imperfect and incomplete case-by-case decisions by the state aid directorate (cf. Cini and McGowan, 1998: 143) or as another example of 'infant' economic analysis in the state aid directorate, which is more legally oriented than the environment directorate, or in EC competition law itself (cf. Hildebrand, 1998: 413) . An optimist might see them as an example of a Commission who is neither blind to international political developments (regarding the emerging international carbon trading market under the Kyoto Protocol) nor to national political preferences (of Denmark) and who is able to find a balance between costs and benefits and between risks and opportunities, indicating that: 'The Danish CO 2 quota system has to be assessed in the light of its merits' (COM, 2000d: 6) .
It is important to observe that the equality principle played a role in the Commission's decision on the Danish scheme, because this principle is also part of the ( The political (albeit not legal) precedent created by the Commission's decision in the Danish case could suggest that grandfathering in a European carbon trading scheme will not only be seen as state aid, but might also be exempted. However, this remains uncertain because of the difference of assessing domestic permit allocation in one (small) Member State versus the assessment of international permit allocation dissimilarities between several Member States. Fourthly, another point which could influence some of the findings in this paper, such as the treatment of state origin criterion or the polluter pays principle, is the philosophical question who has the initial right to (pollute) the environment. In some possible reasonings, for instance that the public (and not the polluter) pays under grandfathering by shifting the hypothetical auctioning revenues as a wealth transfer from the public to the polluters, it is assumed that society at large or the government representing society owns this original property right. However, it could also be claimed that firms and other private entities within society own this right initially if grandfathering should be seen as a method which simply codifies a right the polluters already had. Still, it might be the case that this does not change the analysis of state aid in our particular law and economics paper. Perhaps the state aid discussion goes beyond a normative consideration of initial rights, since the positive legal state aid criteria are framed in terms of state revenues and firm advantages instead of rights.
Research Agenda and Limitations of the Analysis
Some additional research is necessary to find out whether a discussion of original property rights influences the distortion and subsidization analysis and, if so, whether it is likely to become relevant in a political and/or legal decision on grandfathering and state aid.
Conclusion
Do differences in the permit allocation procedures among Member States of the European Union (EU) lead to competitive distortions and state aid in a European carbon trading market?
The answer to this question is that it depends on the perspective taken. In principle, the answer is 'no' from an efficiency perspective, but the answer is 'yes' from an equity perspective.
From an efficiency perspective, grandfathered firms do not have a cost advantage over auctioned firms in other Member States, because the former firms have to include the opportunity costs of holding the permits in the product price. This means that grandfathered firms are not advantaged, so that there is no state aid. In this view, there is also no need to harmonize permit allocation procedures.
However, grandfathered permits are a capital gift to the firm, inducing a windfall profit, so that an identical firm abroad who has to buy its permits has a higher cash outflow and hence less financial resources. Therefore, from an equity perspective, competition (or: the level playing field) is distorted and state aid occurs because the mere allocation of permits leads to unequal changes of the financial positions and competitive relations between firms across the EU. Ceteris paribus, a grandfathered firm in one Member State is then advantaged because it has more financial resources than its auctioned competitor in another Member
State. In this view it is also desirable, or even necessary, to harmonize permit allocation procedures.
The Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection revised in 2001 place a stronger emphasis on cost internalisation than the previous guidelines of 1994. This seems to support grandfathering because of its opportunity costs. However, the provisions for investment and operating aid suggest that firms may receive no more than a certain percentage (for instance 50%) of their permits for free during a limited period of time (for instance five years) as a transition phase towards an auctioned scheme.
In its decision of April 2000 on carbon trading in Denmark, the European Commission considered grandfathering to be state aid, but nevertheless exempted it by using both economic, legal and political arguments. Although it mentioned neither the impact of opportunity costs nor the desire for a level playing field, grandfathering was interpreted as a wealth transfer which could affect the equal treatment of firms. This sets a political (albeit not legal) precedent in the EU to interpret grandfathering in terms of fairness. Nevertheless, recent discussions among stakeholders and the Commission in the European Climate Change
Programme rather point in the direction of leaving Member States free to choose their own permit allocation methods, but they also acknowledge that this must be subject to obtaining any appropriate state aid approvals.
In the context of economic instruments for environmental policy, the Commission has to decide whether permit allocation differences among Member States are compatible with the rules (and exemptions) on state aid. If equity considerations play a role in this decision, the issues of competitive distortion and state aid become relevant in developing a European carbon trading market.
